Using over four decades of British micro data, this paper asks why the narrowing of the gender employment rate gap has stalled since the early 1990s. We find that changes to the structure of employment both between and within industry sectors impacted the gap at approximately constant rates throughout the period, and does not account for the stall. Instead, changes to how the characteristics of women's partners affected their own employment rates address most of the gap's shift in trend. There is also evidence that increases in women's employment when they had children or higher qualifications continued to narrow the gender gap even after it had stalled overall.
Introduction
A long-term view over 20th century Great Britain shows the scale of the increases in women's labour force participation and employment. Combined with falling attachment to the labour force among men, these trends have resulted in a significant narrowing of the gender employment rate gap since the beginning of the last century. 1 However, a different pattern emerges in more recent decades: the trend towards equality of employment between men and women appears to have stalled. Figure 1A shows the absolute gap between male and female UK employment rates from 1971 to 2016.
The overall reduction from 39 to 10 percentage points did not happen at the same rate throughout this period. The gap narrowed by around one percentage point per year between 1971 and 1990, but on average by only a third of a point in the subsequent twenty-five years. This picture is not unique to the UK. For 18 industrialised countries, including the US, Canada and most of Western Europe, Figure 1B plots the relative changes in the female shares of total employment for two consecutive periods (before and after 1990) against each other. Most countries lie below the 45-degree line, implying a slowdown in the rate which gender employment gaps have fallen. The stall in Great Britain is more pronounced than the average among these countries, but less so than in the US, Canada, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, though the Scandinavian countries had smaller gaps left to close by 1990. Notes.-(a) author calculations using ONS Labour Market Statistics (accessed 10/11/2017). Gap is expressed as male minus female. (b) author calculations using ILOSTAT labour market indicators (accessed 10/11/2017). *Canada is [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] due to lack of data availability for 1975.
Numerous studies, summarised in what follows, have looked at the trend in female employment over a long period of time, especially in the US. But this literature, although extremely important, represents evidence on just one side of the employment gap. Our aim in this paper is to shed light on why the gender employment gap in the UK has not continued to narrow as quickly since the early 1990s as it did in the preceding decades. We focus on two potential determinants of long-run changes in employment rates. First, we assess the role of changes to labour force composition and how some individual and household characteristics among men and women relate to employment. Second, we describe the influence of industrial structural change on the time series of gender employment equality.
We use micro data from representative samples of British households to study a measured fall in the gender employment rate gap of 17 percentage points between 1973 and 1989, and a further fall by 2005 of only 7 points. Using shift-share analysis and Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions, we ask whether the changing distribution of some observable characteristics among men and women, or how they affect the likelihood of employment, can account for the pattern of employment rates and the gender gap. We find that the largest part of the gap's stall is accounted for by changes in employment rates related to what we call partner characteristics, which include a partner's employment status and their education levels. The likelihood of employment for a man living in a single person household or with a non-employed partner fell consistently since 1973. The increased employment rate of women whose partners were also working accounted for over 80% of the rise in aggregate female employment before 1989. However, this increase slowed dramatically thereafter, and this accounted for the majority of how the gender gap has stalled. These results suggest that the gender pattern of work in Great Britain is closely related to trends in the share of prime working-age men and women living in households with no work. Greater gender equality in employment has largely been driven by increases in the within household distribution of work, at the expense of greater polarisation of work between households.
It is plausible that the historical rise in the services sectors has been to the comparative advantage of women and has reduced gender work equality in Britain. Confirming this, we find that between-industry shifts in employment accounted for an increased female share of overall employment at approximately the same rate before and after the early 1990s. Within-industry changes in the types of workers employed tended not to favour female employment and, similar to the between-industry effects, did so at about the same rate over the past four decades. Therefore, the pace of industrial structural change in Britain does not account for why the trend towards gender employment equality has stalled. We also show that the overall slowdown in the narrowing of the employment gap coincided with less representation of women within several industry sectors, such as in Manufacturing and Banking & finance, after conditioning on the types of worker characteristics, apart from gender, that these sectors have tended to employ.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing evidence; Section 3 describes how changes to the composition of employment among men and women, and who is working, accounted for the decline and stall in the British employment rate gap; Section 4 analyses what role the pace of industrial structural change has had; Section 5 summarises and further discusses our main findings. Further information is presented in the Online Appendix, describing the main data source, how we constructed a sample of households for analysis and some additional results.
Reviewing the evidence on gender employment gaps in the long run
The evidence on how gender gaps in employment rates have evolved over time is limited. However, insight can be drawn from a large literature which focuses on how female employment has evolved in the long run.
Before proceeding, we note that most of this literature concerns the US experience, with there being less evidence for the UK or other countries.
Historical development and cohort-based analysis
In Great Britain, the female participation rate in both 1850 and 1960 was around 35-40% percent (Joshi et al., 1985; Costa, 2000; Olivetti, 2014) . In the US, only 18% of women worked for pay in 1890, increasing to 26% and 60% percent by 1940 and 2000 respectively (Olivetti, 2014) . Goldin (1990 Goldin ( , 2006 distinguishes three phases in the evolution of US female participation over the last two centuries. The first phase, from the late 19th century to 1920, was characterised by the expansion of single women's employment, with married women's work being at this time still stigmatised. The second phase, from 1920 to 1950, witnessed growth in married women's paid employment, facilitated by increases in office work, new technologies, both in work and the home, and wider school and university enrolment.
The third phase, from 1950 to 1970, saw the expansion of married women's work at an even greater rate.
Within this long period, the 1940s are widely considered a watershed period in the US: a decade of huge changes in the labour force (Goldin, 1991) . However, others have argued that the female employment surge was only temporary and, as soon as the War was over, women returned to exclusive household work. 2 Goldin (1990) 's long-term analysis of US women's work also represents a helpful introduction to cohort-based analyses. For US women born before the 1950s, she shows that labour force participation over the life cycle rose steeply from their 20s to late 40s, and then decreased in their early 50s. But this changed for the women born since the mid-1950s, who experienced a higher participation rate overall, but with a dip in the middle (the so-called 'sagging middle'), and a phasing out that began at a later age than for previous cohorts. Goldin and Mitchell (2017) suggest that the sagging middle of the life cycle is due to the greater employment rates of women in their 20s, together with delayed childbearing and the impacts of motherhood. In another prominent US cohort-based analysis, Attanasio et al. (2008) study the life-cycle labour supply of three birth cohorts in the US: the Elizabeth Dole (1930s), Hillary Clinton (1940s) and Ophra Winfrey (1950s) generations. While the Clintons worked more than the Doles, both cohorts' participation was low during childbearing years, which was no longer the case in the Winfrey cohort. The authors' analysis suggests that the increased participation over the life cycle for the 1950s cohort was accounted for in large part by the decreased childcare costs relative to wages.
Evidence for the UK is more sparse. Joshi et al. (1985) look at birth cohorts working between 1850 and 1980, finding that the increase in female participation in post-war Britain until the 1970s was mainly among married women aged over 35, and that cohort-specific factors explained most of this secular increase in participation. Gregg et al. (2007) analyse the role of policy and legislative changes during the period 1974-2000, isolating birth cohorts whose mothers experienced significant increases in employment. They find that an important role was played by maternity rights, which affected mothers' decisions to return to work.
Industrial structure and the demand for skills or occupations
Another perspective emphasises the role of changes in the economic structure of countries on gender equality. Echoes of this can be traced as far back as Adam Smith's argument that the development of commerce and industry would improve women's economic position by reducing the social position of the military (Dimand et al., 2004) . More recently it would be the decline of jobs in manufacturing and the growth of the services sectors that plays to the comparative advantage of women, resulting in a relative increase in the demand for female labour (Goldin, 2006; Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017) . This comparative advantage can be explained by the services sectors being associated with the more intensive use of 'brain' and interpersonal skills or tasks, as opposed to those associated with 'brawn', and therefore by these sectors creating jobs which are considered more suitable for women who aspire to work. Petrongolo (2014, 2016) show that the process of structural change, through differences and changes in the services share of the economy, can account for more than half of the cross-country variation in women's relative labour market outcomes.
Other specific factors
The literature has discussed several other factors in the the evolution of female employment over time and the differential experiences of some cohorts. These factors include: increased education; reduced hours; increased real wages; technological change; decreased fertility; increased awareness of the role of women from changing social attitudes or the expansion of the feminist movement; the household division of labour; and the income and labour market positions of partners. The impact of these factors has more often been studied in isolation rather than in combination. In an example of the latter, Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011) analyse the trends in US female employment between 1964 and 2007 with a dynamic model including education, earnings, fertility, marriage and divorce. They find that more education accounted for around a third of the increase in female employment, while the rise in real wages and narrowing of the gender wage gap accounted for a further 20%. Both a decline in fertility and an increase in the prevalence of divorce accounted for small amounts, while approximately 40% of the increase remains unexplained by observed characteristics. For the UK, Gomulka and Stern (1990) study the evolution of employment between 1970 and 1983. They conclude that changes in labour supply behaviour played a major role, as opposed to changes in the prevalence of characteristics related to work among women, such as education levels. They suggest this was affected by the introduction from the 1970s of more stringent employment and equalities legislation. Gutiérrez-Domènech and Bell (2004) extend this analysis to the period 1984-2002. They also find that in the 1980s changes in behaviour contributed to female participation growth. Overall, they suggest that periods of greater female participation changes are those in which changes in behaviour have a positive and significant impact.
The role of human capital in long-term labour market trends has been the subject of a vast literature (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) . Olivetti (2006) shows that the substantial increase in US married women's hours of market work between 1970 and 1990 can mostly be explained by greater returns to labour market experience. Her estimates of the gender-specific human capital production function show that women's marginal returns to experience increased by 25% across the decades, compared with a 6% increase for men. When applied within a model which features human capital accumulation, home production and childcare provision for married couples, these relative changes in returns to experience can explain 96% of the observed increase in married women's hours of work over their life-cycles. Greenwood et al. (2005) describe how the development of labour-saving technology in the household sector, such as washing machines and microwave ovens, could explain more than half of the rise in US female labour force participation between 1900 and 1980. Technological progress in the home has also been a significant driver of the decline in marriage and the rise in divorce in the US, which have had additional effects on US employment gaps and income inequality, especially between households (Greenwood et al., 2016) . Other advances in the household affecting the time costs of women's reproductive role and their comparative advantage in childcare, for example instant (baby) formula, were probably significant in married women's increased participation in the mid-part of the 19th century (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016) .
The extent to which the rise in female participation can be explained by increases in relative real wages has also been well-studied. Smith and Ward (1985) find that rising real wages accounted for 60% of the total expansion in the US female labour force during the 1950-1980 period. Layard et al. (1980) estimate labour supply elasticities from the 1974 UK General Household Survey, concluding that real wages explained about one third of the increase in female participation between 1973 and 1977 . Huang (2018 discusses how the decline in US female labour force participation observed since 2000 may be associated with falling real wages among women once education levels are accounted for. Related is the evidence on the so-called added-worker effect, whereby women might theoretically increase their labour supply due to a reduction in their partner's income (Layard et al., 1980; Attanasio et al., 2005; Benito and Saleheen, 2013) . This has been a popular explanation for the rise in US female participation in the 1970s and 1980s, since this period also coincided with a significant decline in aggregate male wage growth. However, Juhn and Murphy (1997) show that the individual-level evidence during this period tells a different story: the most rapid increases in US femalelabour supply during this period were among women married to men with relatively high wages, and high-wage men also experienced greater wage increases over this period; conversely women married to low-wage men slowed their rate of labour force entry in the 1970s and 1980s, just as their husband's wage growth also declined rapidly.
The impact of legislation and other institutional developments has also been widely studied. These have affected, for example, fertility rates, medical advances and the tendency of women to marry later (Goldin and Katz, 2002) , to plan childbearing and their career (Bailey, 2006) , and to reconcile work and motherhood (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016) . Specifically, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) find little compelling evidence on the impact of parental leave on gender gaps in a set of OECD countries, while finding stronger evidence on the positive impact of early childhood spending and in-work benefits. For Britain, Gregg et al. (2007) conclude that it was the interaction between legislative measures and an increase in relative earnings, along with the reduction in taxation of part-time work, that determined the overall transformation of married women's employment between 1974 and 2000. These effects on the British labour market were not uniform but concerned mostly women with employed partners and relatively high levels of education.
A common theme of these explanations and the related empirical evidence is that the issue of gender labour supply cannot be separated from what happens at the household level. Indeed, some of the most prominent research on labour supply has emphasised the household context in which work and consumption decisions take place (e.g. Blundell and Macurdy, 1999; Doepke and Tertilt, 2016) . Moreover, the development of women's employment during most of the 20th century was a story of increased married labour force participation driving the overall level. A more recent literature has suggested that the economic nature of households, and especially the differences between them, has changed markedly in recent decades. Gregg et al. (2010) document the conflicting trends between individual and household labour market outcomes for the US, Britain, Germany, Spain and Australia. In these countries, individual worklessness rates have fallen over the past two decades, while household-based rates have not. For the UK, Wadsworth (2001, 2008) find that the most important contribution over time has come from work polarisation across households. For a given employment rate there have been large increases in the prevalence of dual-earner and no-earner couples over time. Jobs appear to have transferred to better-educated women, while older and less-educated men have lost out. These groups of men and women do not typically share the same households.
Stalling gender equality progress
Few studies focus on explaining the stalling of progress since the 1990s. Goldin (2006) points out that whether or not the trend in US women's participation has levelled off depends on the age group examined.
The evidence is that women in their 30s continue to be committed to the labour force, probably because "they were in the labor force for longer before they married, invested more in formal and informal training, and shaped their identities before having children". Blau and Kahn (2007) 's analysis of US married women's labour supply finds that most of the change since the 1990s is explained by the dramatic 50% reduction in women's own wage labour supply. Considering that a husband's own wage elasticity did not change substantially in this period, they conclude that married women's and married men's responses to wages were becoming more similar. Aaronson et al. (2006) show how the lower US participation rate since 2000 is in stark contrast to the increasing trend of the previous three decades. They suggest the stall since the mid-1990s in the progress of higher female participation with each successive birth cohort was associated with cohorts of women born since the 1950s not having substantially greater attachment to work than those before them. This is confirmed by Lee (2014) , who finds this was the case regardless of education, childbearing, caring responsibilities and marital status. Juhn and Potter (2006) also suggest that the female rate is unlikely to rise above the level seen in the 1990s, unless there are Government or private sector-led initiatives, such as the expansion of income tax credits, changes to social security that increase the retirement age and employer-led initiatives to improve flexible working. Fortin (2015) suggests that gender role attitudes explain a third of the US levelling off: post-1966 birth cohorts hold more traditional gender role attitudes than the baby-boomer cohort, particularly regarding housewifery. Macunovich (2009) , also for the US, finds that the reversal in the pattern of ever greater female employment rates has not only been among highly educated women with young children, but has been more general and especially marked among single women, women with no children, and women with more than 16 years of education (college graduates), who have high marriage and fertility rates.
In summary, substantial explanations are still missing on the stalled employment gap since the 1990s, while most research has focused on the longer term increase in female employment. Regarding the latter, three explanations appear to be the most prominent: the relative increase in female real wages, the household dimension, and the potential role played by structural changes to the economy and the associated increase in the employment share of the services sectors. In what follows, we provide further evidence on the latter two of these explanations for the UK, and we discuss briefly the role of the gender wage gap at the end.
3 Did the British employment gap stall for some but not for others?
We use microdata from Great Britain's General Household Survey (GHS) covering the period 1972-2006.
This was a repeated annual cross-section study, collected as a stratified random sample, and contains information for households and all their individual members. 3 Online Appendix Figure A1 shows that, for the resultant sample, the trends we observe in the male and female employment rates and, especially, the level of the gap between them match those published by the ONS for the full UK working-age population over the period .
What a gender-blind distribution of work could look like
To illustrate how the employment rate gap has changed over time, in the context of shifting demand for worker characteristics, we begin with a motivating and descriptive representation of what a 'gender-blind' distribution of work could look like in Great Britain. Let the observed employment rate of a worker with gender g ∈ {m, f } and type of personal characteristics i be e ig . The share of the male or female population who are type i is given by α ig . Terms referring to non-gendered employment rates or shares of the population omit the g subscript. A starting point for a counterfactual gender-blind distribution of work is one where only differences in population type shares, given the non-gendered employment rate for each type, should determine the observed gender gap:
We then describe an adjusted gap, subtracting this counterfactual from the actual value, thus addressing how much of he gap in any period is not accounted for by the different distribution of worker types among men and women:
In this way, we describe what the gap would be if the type-specific employment rates of men and women were the same. Or, in other words, what the gap would be if it was determined only, for example, by higher employment rates for those with degrees, or for those who are married, and so on. if men and women had gender-blind employment rates, we would have expected to measure a decrease in the gender gap between 1973 and 1993 which was less than a third of that actually observed. The overall non-gendered composition of British employment moving through this period tended to decreasingly favour the personal characteristics held by men relative to women. Not only do gender differences in workers'
type-specific employment rates account for most of the gender gap throughout these four decades, but they also account for the majority of its decrease too. Since 1993, they also account for the entirety of why the narrowing of the gap has stalled: despite accounting for a minority of the actual gap's decrease before 1993, the counterfactual accounts for all of the decrease since then to 2005. This suggests that the changing overall composition of work, and the non-gendered supply or demand of personal characteristics to the labour market, is unlikely to explain why progress in closing the gender gap has stalled more recently.
Instead, this motivates us to look for evidence of changes in the gender-specific trends of labour supply behaviour.
FIGURE 2: Gender employment rates and gap, age 25-54.
Notes.-author calculations using General Household Survey, 1972 Survey, -2006 . Gap is expressed as male minus female. The counterfactual should be interpreted as the level or gap which would occur only due to the different relative prevalence of characteristics among men and women; i.e. not because similar men and women have different employment rates. Shaded areas denote official periods of UK recessions.
These general measures and our discussion thereof offer little in the way of any specific explanation for why the employment gap appears to have stalled since the early 1990s. We attempt to address this in what follows. Also, this gender-blind analysis is limited by the extent to which the values e i , being functions of both e i f and e im , provide a reasonable way to construct a counterfactual. By construction, the actual employment rate for each worker type is endogenous to the disproportionate demand and supply of male and female work throughout the economy. The distribution of work across personal characteristics could in fact be very different in a truly gender-blind economy.
Worker characteristics and household employment
We improve on the analysis above to assess how the employment rate gap has changed over time and to disentangle the roles of the gender type-specific employment rates and the composition of types in the population. We do this in two steps. First, we carry out a shift-share analysis of male and female rates, and consequently the gap, which sheds some light on what factors can account for the latter's trends. We then apply a regression-based decomposition of the changes in male and female employment rates and their gap through time. This latter approach considers each set of worker and household types jointly, compared with the shift-share analysis, which can only address in turn the unconditional contribution from the changes in the employment rates associated with each mutually exclusive set of characteristics. To focus on accounting for why the gap has stalled, we split our analysis period into equal length sub-periods, thus decomposing changes relative to initial values in years x ∈ {(19)73, 89}.
Shift-share analysis
Starting with the shift-share analysis, the change in the employment rate gap can be written as
Composition shifts
where t denotes some year subsequent to the initial value and ∆ t−x denotes the difference operator relative to that initial period. 5 The 'Composition shifts' represent how much of the change in the gap between years x and t is due to changes in the share of the male and female population who are of type i. The 'Employment rate changes' represent how much of the change in the gap is accounted for by differences in the employment rates change of males and females. shifts account for a third of the change in the gap in the second period, compared with around an eighth in the first period. Employment rate changes account for the clear majority of why the gap declined in the first period, and the lack of similar changes in the second period accounts for why its decline slowed during this time. This slowdown appears to be driven by a decrease of 11 and an increase of 7 percentage points in the male and female rates in the first period, respectively, with comparable decreases of 4 and 0 percentage points in the second period. This evidence suggests it was these latter changes, as opposed to those in the composition of the prime-working-age population, that accounted for the declining pace of the gender gap decrease from the 1990s onwards.
We can also address how changes in employment rates by highest qualification account for the decline and stall in the gender gap. Table 1 shows how between 1973 and 1989 the fall in the gap was mostly accounted for by changes in the employment rates of men and women with no qualifications, increasing the overall female rate by 3 percentage points, and decreasing the male rate by 9 points. However, between 1989 and 2005 both male and female employment rates for those with no qualifications decreased by 2 percentage points. Therefore, the majority of the slowdown in closing the gender gap is accounted for by the employment rates of men and women with no qualifications equally worsening in recent decades, whereas previously women's increasing relative employment in this group had rapidly contributed to closing the overall gap.
Looking at the contribution of employment rate changes solely by the individual's dependent children type, much of the reduction in the pace at which the gap declined between the two periods can be accounted for by the changes for those with no children or no infant, and especially for women in these categories.
The increasing employment rate of women with no, or non-infant children initially contributed to decrease the gender gap before 1989, but from 1989 to 2005 the employment rate of these types decreased.
In terms of 'partner status', it was the large increase in the employment of women with employed partners in the first period, relative to the second, that accounted for the the stall in the closing of the gap.
Over half the contribution of overall employment rate changes in 1973-1989 was driven by changes in the employment rate of these women, whereas in 1989-2005 this proportion fell to just over one third. The reduction in the employment rate of men with no partner in 1973-1989 accounted for roughly two thirds of the reduction in the overall male employment rate in 1973-1989, compared with just less than a half in 1989-2005. 6 Regression-based decomposition Equation 3 and the results of Table 1 only allow for comparisons of the impact of employment rate changes for each mutually exclusive set of characteristics. We now quantify how much of the change in male and female employment rates and the gap between them can be jointly explained either by changes to the composition of the workforce or by changes to estimated parameters, which associate individual or household characteristics with employment more generally. To do so, we use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as extended for use in binary-response models (Fairlie, 1999 (Fairlie, , 2006 Bauer and Sinning, 2008 should help to alleviate this problem by excluding those at the extremes of the labour force age distribution.
We first estimate logit models of male and female employment in selected years. The dependent variables considered in these models, contained in X gt , are dummies for an individual's five-year banded Table A2 . From each of these models we take the vector of parameter estimates, β gt , which represents the change in probability of employment associated with a change in each variable in X gt . We then decompose the change in the gender employment rate gap between the initial year x and time t as
where E β mx [e mt |X mt ] is the expected male employment rate conditional on the labour force composition observed in period t, but evaluated with the parameters that associate characteristics with employment in period x. We use parameter estimates β gt from each gender-year employment model as estimates of β gt .
The 'Composition' effect gives the change in the gender employment rate gap explained by changes in the distribution of observables in X gt . The 'Coefficients' effect is the amount explained by changes in the response of employment rates, β gt , acting via the initial distribution of observable characteristics in the labour force. With this effect derived directly from the coefficients of individual year-gender employment models, any differences in impact across time periods may capture changing labour supply or demand behaviour.
The results of this double (time and gender) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition are summarised in Table 2 and Figure 3 . Focusing on the last two columns of Table 2 , which show the change in the gender gap, the overall Coefficients effect accounts for the vast majority of the decline in the employment gap and its stall Comparable changes for women, however, resulted in an increase of 3 percentage points in the female employment rate in the first period, but a decrease approximately equal to that of the male rate in the second period. This reversal between periods would suggest a significant change in how the characteristics of women's partners affected the likelihood they were employed. Both highlighted factors, which appear to have shifted the male and female employment trends, raise concerns of potentially important omitted variables. Some predictors of an individual's employment status are potentially missing from our analysis, such as disability status. These missing worker characteristics could be more or less correlated over time with those we are able to include in the regression models. For example, it may be the case that a large proportion of men have partners who are non-employed because of high levels of household wealth. If there were large increases over time in the number of men with wealthy, non-employed partners, then the estimated employment effects of having a non-employed partner will be overestimated, and the associated Coefficients effects we account for in the decomposition would then be exaggerated between periods. 1973-1989 and 1989-2005 respectively. In this decomposition it is not possible to disentangle the role of the life-cycle from birth cohort effects. However, we can see that our estimates of these effects did not have a major role in explaining why the gap's progress has stalled, compared with the much greater role of the partner characteristics effects.
There is evidence in Table 2 that improved prospects for women who were highly qualified and who had dependent children continued to close the employment rate gap beyond 1990. The last two columns of the table show that changes in the coefficients relating these characteristics to employment reduced the gap by a larger amount in the second period relative to the first. Specifically, in 1973 Specifically, in -1989 Coefficients effects accounted for a reduction in the likelihood a woman with dependent children being in employment, however in 1989-2005 they led to a 2 percentage points increase in the female employment rate. Also, while changes in the coefficients relating women's highest qualifications to employment resulted in an increased likelihood of employment in both 1973-1989 and 1989-2005 , in the latter period the overall effect was 1.5 percentage points larger. The Coefficients effect in the case of qualifications, however, explains roughly the same proportion of the total change in the female employment rate as the related Composition effect.
This suggests that both changes in the distribution of qualifications among women, and how they affect the likelihood of female employment, have been important in preventing a reversal of the overall employment rate gap trend.
Figure 3 also depicts results from the decomposition of the change in the employment rate gender gap using, for illustrative purposes, four equally spaced time sub-periods: 1973-1981, 1981-1989, 1989-1998, and 1997-2005 . It shows the reduction in the total gender employment rate gap in each period. It also highlights the relative importance of Coefficients relative to Composition effects, with the former being smaller in magnitude in all but the last period when the majority of the slowdown occurred. For completeness, Online Appendix Figure B5 provides equivalent illustrations for changes in the male and female employment rates individually.
FIGURE 3: Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition of the change in the gender employment rate gap, 1973-81, 1981-89, 1989-97 and 1997-2005 4 Does the pace of industrial structural change account for stalling progress?
As summarised before, several studies have attributed the historical pace of structural change -typically describing the rise and fall of industry shares of aggregate output, total hours worked or employment -to trends in gender labour market outcomes in the UK and elsewhere. In a general equilibrium framework, changes to industry structure, the demand for specific worker types by those industries, and industry-or worker-type-specific wages, could all be co-determined with the supply of employment by different worker types (see for examples Petrongolo, 2014 and Ngai and . However, the analysis of the previous section broadly takes this co-determination as a given, and instead only accounted for how the changing composition of worker types and their associated employment rates might explain the stalled progress in gender equality in Britain since the early 1990s. In this section, we look at the other side of the coin, accounting for the changing pace of industrial transformation in the British labour market, approximately taking as given how the prevalence of worker types in employment has also changed over time. Before proceeding, we should note the possibility that changes in male and female labour supply have in fact driven the changing industry composition of British employment. However, as argued by Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) , the existing evidence to date suggests this is not a major issue, and that it is a reasonable assumption that the growth in the services sector in developed economies was driven by demand factors associated with technical change, and that labour supply factors were approximately neutral in determining the industry mix of employment.
We classify workers across eight major industry sectors, which we define to give approximately Like Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) and Ngai and Petrongolo (2017) , who characterise trends in the female share of hours worked in several countries, we quantify how much of the changes in the female share of total employment are accounted for by changes between and within British industry sectors, using a shift-share analysis. Let F kt be the share of all employment in sector k which is female in some period t.
The share of sector k in total employment is represented by λ kt . A shift-share decomposition of the change in the whole economy's female employment share, since initial period x ∈ {(19)73, 82, 94} is then given by
Within-ind. gender shares
The results of this decomposition are presented in Table 3 . The first component of the above, which we label 'Ind. composition shifts', gives the change in the female employment share since each initial period arising from changes only in the industry composition of employment: i.e. holding constant the composition of employment within each sector, but allowing only for changes in the composition of employment between sectors. For the periods 1973-9 and 1982-93 , approximately half of the rise in the female employment share was accounted for by changes in the industry composition of British employment.
We also see in Table 3 that for the later period 1994-2005, these between-industry shifts in employment accounted for a rising female employment share at approximately the same rate as before. However, this was after the narrowing of the gender gap had stalled, and so these changes then accounted for more than the actual rise in the female share of employment over that period. Based on this evidence, it appears a slowdown in the pace of industrial structural change does not account for the stall in gender employment equality since the early 1990s. It is therefore unlikely that factors such as technical change could explain the stall. Instead, as Figure 4 also shows for changes in the female share of employment throughout each of the three sub-periods, the slowdown in what we label as changes in 'Within industry gender shares' accounts for the stall in gender employment equality. However, the role of factors such as technical change cannot be completely ruled out from the analysis above. For instance, if some industries have tended to employ relatively more highly qualified workers over time, possibly due to technical change, then we would expect this to have negatively affected the female share of employment, since men make up a larger proportion of those with higher qualifications. To assess this, we can rewrite the contribution in (5) from the changes in within-industry gender shares for any industry sector k as
Emp. type gender shares
where µ ikt refers to the share of worker type i in the total employment of sector k, and F it refers to the female share in the total employment of worker type i. What we label 'Within-ind. emp. type shifts' now accounts for the role of changes to the types of workers typically employed in each industry sector. Specifically, we focus on the role of education levels in the workforce over time, i.e. suppose that i denotes the four levels of an individual's highest qualification. Table 3 shows how these 'Industry education demand shifts' do in fact account for a fall in the female share of overall employment in all three sub-periods. Similar to the contribution from between-industry employment shifts, this within-industry component would have accounted for a change in the female employment share at approximately the same rate throughout our sample period. This further emphasises that a change of pace in whatever the labour demand factors might be is highly unlikely to explain the stalled gap, either through such a slowdown affecting the extent to which employment has moved between sectors, or through how its composition has changed within sectors. Instead, changes to 'Employment-education gender shares' accounted for large rises in the female share of employment before the early 1990s, but only a relatively small amount since. Overall then, this decomposition shows that other factors, as discussed in the preceding section, account for how the recent narrowing of the gap has stalled in Britain.
Have employment gaps continued to close in some sectors but not in others?
The previous results are largely silent on the heterogeneity in both the level and changes of the gender gaps within industry sectors. To shed light on this we return to our approach of describing what gender-blind distributions of work could have looked like. In a similar way as before, we derive the female employment shares within each industry sector that we would predict based on those sectors' gender-blind 'demand' for worker characteristics, using the same set of 180 different worker types as before in Section 3. For example, we consider what would be the female share of the Construction sector if it employed men and women with no qualifications, who are married, with no children etc. in the same proportion as there are such men and women in the prime working-age population, without any regard for gender. We then subtract these predicted, or conditional, gender-blind female shares from their actual levels in each year, such that a negative value for this difference indicates that women were disproportionately under-represented in that sector. We interpret this as a measure of relative female under/over-representation, conditioning on the composition of worker types employed by each sector. Table 4 shows these differences for the eight major 
Summary and further discussion
In several developed countries, the movement towards gender equality in the labour market has slowed in recent decades. The trend in this regard stalled for British employment after the early 1990s. We have attempted to answer how this happened. As the development of the gender gap is strictly linked to that in female participation, our analysis has focused on two of three main explanations that have been traditionally put forward to explain the trend in female participation: the household dimension and the role played by structural changes to the economy. We have found that factors such as technical change, which we observed through their effects on the mixing of employment and worker types between and within industry sectors, do not appear to account for the relative changes in the trends of male and female prime-working-age employment. Similarly, the composition of individual characteristics, between and among men and women, does not address the stall. Instead we found that changes in the employment rates associated with some individual characteristics, particularly those relating to partners or the lack thereof, account for why the employment rate gap has stalled. Before the shift in trend, the relatively rapid rise in gender equality had tended to take place within households, while employment inequality across households grew: more highly educated women, whose partners tended to also be in paid work, replaced less educated men, whose wives or partners did not see their own likelihoods of working increasing much at all.
Section 2 synthesized some of the evidence on the role that changes in real wages might have played in explaining the long-term rise in female participation. Indeed, the increased opportunity cost of paid work has been related to increasing female participation over time: when real wages go up, women tend to substitute unpaid for paid work or increase their hours of work. 8 Therefore, a natural question we have yet failed to address is whether the stalling of the gender employment gap since the 1990s is associated with changes in UK real wages. Figure 5 shows that, unlike the employment rate, the decreasing gender gaps in real wages and hours worked per person have not stalled in recent decades in the UK. Female real hourly wages increased at a higher rate than male wages between 1975 and 2005, resulting in a generally constant rate of wage gap decrease over the same period of time. Why then did the employment rate gap stall while the real wage gap kept on falling since the 1990s? To attempt to rationalise this, we look back at the extensive margin: we would expect to see an increasing female participation rate and a reduction in the gender gap in participation. This is shown in Figure 6 (a). If this rise in participation did not translate into higher employment, then the increased female labour supply must have resulted in increased unemployment rates, especially among women. However, panel Figure 6 (b) shows that the average unemployment rate gap in the UK has not changed much since the early 1990s, while there is evidence of a shift in the early 1980s, almost a decade earlier, when the male unemployment rate overtook the female rate (see Albanesi and Sahin, 2018 for similar evidence of this pattern in the US). This therefore leaves two further possible explanations. First, the stalling of the employment rate is explained mostly by the male employment rate.
Indeed, Table 1 showed that the decline in the UK employment rate gap since the early 90s was entirely due to the decline in the male employment rate, while the female rate neither increased or decreased. The other explanation could be that the constant rate of increase in female real wages is illusory, as found by Huang (2018) for the US: the growth in real wages there was more than accounted for by the substantial rise in women's educational attainment. Unfortunately, for the UK, the paucity and inconsistency of the available sources of historical earnings data do not allow us to robustly assess this possible explanation. Notes.-the series for "Real hourly wages" are taken from Elsby et al. (2016) , who calculated these mean values using the representative British New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset for all employees aged 25-59 in April, excluding the top and bottom 1% of male and female hourly wages in each year. Real wages were expressed in April 2012 pounds using the ONS RPIX prices index. "Hours worked per person" are author calculations using General Household Survey, 1972 Survey, -1998 only: the same sample of individuals and households as described throughout Sections 3 & 4. Working hours were not consistently recorded after 1998 when compared with before. See Online Appendix Table A2 . Gaps are expressed as male minus female. Shaded areas denote official periods of UK recessions.
FIGURE 6: Gender unemployment rate and participation rate gaps in the UK, ages (a) Participation rate (b) Unemployment rate
Notes.-author calculations using ONS Labour Market Statistics (accessed 10/11/2017). Gap is expressed as male minus female. Unemployment rate expressed as the share of economically active persons.
It is also important to ask whether this stall in employment equality is the new norm: can we expect the gap to close any time soon? We have shown that between-industry shifts in employment have consistently tended to account for a reduction in the British gender employment gap. We also found that changes in the observable composition of worker types filling jobs within industry sectors, with regards the levels of education, have over the same period consistently worked against closing the gap. However, the contribution from between-industry shifts was of a magnitude greater. But it is only practical to envisage that these shifts in employment cannot be limitless. The last UK Census in 2011 showed that 81% of the workforce was engaged in the services sectors, an increase of 6 percentage points compared with 2001, though the preceding decades had seen even larger relative increases in the services share of employment. 9
If the pace of structural change in Britain permanently slows, or that change becomes less friendly to women in terms of the types of jobs created and destroyed, then it is hard to see a path to the employment gap closing significantly further.
As summarised before, many previous studies have made clear that the long-run trends and recent patterns in female work have been very much a married women's affair. In looking ahead, however, it seems important to relate this more directly to the findings on household work polarisation of Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) and Gregg and Wadsworth (2008) . The household dimension of work sheds light on issues that a singular focus on individual employment rates does not. In our own analysis, we observed that the trends of household polarisation place a set of bounds within which gender employment rates have simultaneously evolved. The substantial growth in female employment before the early 1990s subsequently slowed down as it approached the limit imposed by these bounds; i.e. once there had already been very large increases in the employment of women whose partners were also very likely to work. The implication then is that little more progress could be achieved in the aggregate gap from further increases in the employment of highly-educated married women. For the gap to fall further, the bounds placed by the extent of the household polarisation of work imply that the labour market needs to see more women moving into work whose partners are not working or, paradoxically, men whose partners do work to stop working themselves. to 2004 the survey reported on a financial-year basis, running annually from April to March. The survey was designed to collect consistent and nationally representative information on the social, demographic and economic characteristics of households over time. As such, the survey questionnaire and variables of the GHS were subject to minimal year-to-year changes. To obtain a representative sample of Great Britain, the survey used a probability stratified two-stage sample design, with households stratified first by geographical location and then by economic indicators, such as the proportion of households with no car. The survey run was only broken in 1997/98 and 1999/2000 for review. The former break led to changes thereafter in the survey design, which did not significantly impact any of the key individual nor household variables we use here. The latter break was to review the sampling procedure to continue to maintain representativeness. From 2006 the GHS content was redesigned, as per EU requirements, to contain comparable data to the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and became the General Lifestyle Survey (GLS).
We use the GHS Time Series data set, which contains a set of key variables from each annual wave of data between 1972 and 2004. It was originally referred to as the GHS Pseudo-Cohort Dataset. The time series dataset was created by the ONS to analyse changes in social and economic inequalities over those three decades or so. To correct for small discrepancies between years, all variables were adjusted to match their most recent version. For example, all 'Marital Status' variables prior to 1992 were adjusted to contain a category for 'Cohabiting', due to its inclusion as a possible response from that year onwards. An indicative reference for the GHS time series dataset is as follows: Office for National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division. (2007) . General Household Survey: Time Series Dataset, 1972 Dataset, -2004 . UK Data Service. SN: 5664. We favour the GHS Time Series dataset over other annual nationally representative surveys, such as the UK Annual Population and Labour Force Surveys, due to its detail at the household level and its consistent design over a long period of time. We extend the time series dataset by adding some variables from the annual cross-sectional datasets for 1972-2004, such To create a consistent and practical analysis dataset, we drop all observations with missing values for any of the variables later used to define a worker's type, employment status or industry of employer. Partners are matched by identifying compatible pairs of individuals who share the same household and family identifiers, and report to be similarly married, cohabiting or in a same-sex couple. In the tiny number of cases where partners could not be definitively traced within the datasets, these households and individuals were dropped. 'Partner characteristics' are then defined simply as the characteristics of the person with whom each of these individuals was matched. The GHS classifies a family as "A married or opposite sex cohabiting couple on their own; or a married or opposite sex cohabiting couple, or a lone parent, and their never-married children (who may be adult), provided these children have not children of their own". The analysis sample therefore represents an approximate random and representative sample of people aged 25-54 who were living in Britain each year between 1972 and 2006. Table A1 documents a decline in the analysis sample size over the period both for men and women. However, this is not due to any restrictions we place on the sample or increasing survey non-response, but rather a combination of financial constraints faced by the ONS and the use of different sampling procedures over time. In all the analysis described in the main text, we pool the sample for each three-year period to improve accuracy, such that estimates of the employment rate for 1973 are based on the 1972-1974 pooled samples of the GHS. As shown in Figure A1 , the trends in both British male and female employment rates aged 25-54, and the gap between them, in the resulting sample of the GHS, match those used by the ONS as UK National Statistics for the working-age population over the same period, derived from the Labour Force Survey. Not only the trends, but the cyclical patterns in the employment rates estimated from the two separate sources are also comparable.
Every man and woman in our analysis sample is assigned to one of 180 mutually exclusive worker types or groups, based on the complete interaction of a set of observable characteristics. For example, married men/women, who have a degree, two non-infant children, a wife/husband who is employed and who also has A-levels as their highest qualification, are assigned to a specific worker type for that exact combination of characteristics. Table A2 below contains notes on the variables from both the GHS Time Series (TS) and annual cross-sectional datasets which were used to define these individual worker types. Notes.-see Figure B2 , except analysis is a shift-share decomposition over partner employment status.
FIGURE B5: Blinder-Oaxaca type decompositions of the change in the male and female employment rates, 1973-81, 1981-89, 1989-97 and 1997-2005 , 1973-81, 1981-89, 1989-97 and 1997-2005 (ppts) , 1973-81, 1981-89, 1989-97 and 1997-2005 (ppts) Notes.-see Table B1 TABLE B3: Contributions from within-sector gender share changes to the overall change in the female share of total employment, 1982-93 and 1994-2005 (ppts) 
